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Abstract
I was asked to speak about corruption and democracy. I have a long history of concern about
that relationship. The subject of corruption and democracy is best broken into three separate
areas. First, there are questions of corruption that have no special relationship to democracy at
all. Still, they present very important practical and moral issues which I will identify. Second,
I will examine the particular relationships of corruption and democracy. Third, I will review the
democratic means for ﬁghting the problem of corruption.ADDRESS
DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION*
Philip B. Heymann**
Introduction
I  was  asked  to  speak  about  corruption  and  democracy.  I
have  a long history  of concern  about that relationship.  In  the
United States,  I helped establish  the Watergate Special  Prosecu-
tion Force that investigated and prosecuted the wrong-doings of
the  Nixon  Administration.'  I was  our chief prosecutor  during
the  Carter Administration and  responsible  at that time for our
ABSCAM investigation'  and prosecutions where, in the name of
a fictional Middle-Eastern  Sheik, we  offered money in exchange
for  legislative  services  to  a number  of Congressmen  and  Sena-
tors.3  We  received  too many affirmative  responses.4  I was most
recently  the  first Deputy Attorney General  under President  Bill
Clinton where I had to address, among other matters, the inves-
tigation  of our most powerful  Congressman,'  the Chairman  of
the  House  of Representatives  Committee  that  deals  with  taxa-
tion, for various matters as to which he has now pled guilty.6  Be-
tween  those occasions,  I  have  worked  in Guatemala  and  South
Africa and, to a lesser extent, Russia-all  places  where the sub-
ject of corruption  and  democracy  has  at times been  very rele-
*  This  Address  was  originally  given  at  the  Milenio  Foundation  conference  on
corruption  in Latin America and  Europe held in Bogota, Colombia on July 2-4,  1996.
**  Philip B.  Heymann  is James Barr  Ames  Professor of Law,  Harvard  University
Law  School.
1. Charles  R.  Babcock, Heymann of Harvard, Watergate Ex-Aide, Picked for  Justice  Job,
WASH.  POST,  Mar.  29,  1978, at A9.
2. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,  BRIBES 606-07  (1984).  The U.S.  Government used a ficti-
tious business, Abdul Enterprises, as a cover for a sting operation.  Id. at 605.  ABSCAM
is a contraction  of Abdul  and scam.  Id.
3.  Id. at 604-19.
4.  See id. (describing  success of ABSCAM);  United States  v. Myers,  635 F.2d  945,
947-48  (2d Cir.  1980)  (summarizing ABSCAM  operation).
5.  See Toni Locy,  Rostenkowski Fraud  Plea Brings 17-Month Sentence; Former Ways and
Means Chief  Fined $100,000, WASH.  PosT, Apr.  10,  1996, at Al  (describing sentencing of
Representative  Dan  Rostenkowski).
6.  Id.  On April 9,  1996, Rostenkowski  pleaded guilty  to two  counts  of mail fraud
and was  sentenced  to  17 months in prison  and fined US$100,000.  Id.
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vant.  Finally, I have met with experts and delivered talks in Mex-
ico and Argentina over relatively extended periods, again on the
subject of corruption and democracy.
The  subject  of corruption  and  democracy  is  best  broken
into  three  separate  areas.  First, there  are questions  of corrup-
tion  that have no  special relationship  to democracy  at all.  Still,
they present very important practical  and  moral  issues which  I
will identify.  Second, I will  examine the particular relationships
of corruption  and  democracy.  Third,  I  will  review  the  demo-
cratic means for fighting the problem of corruption.
I.  CORRUPTION WITHOUT SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO DEMOCRACY
Perhaps like many people,  I tend to think of the problems
of corruption in  terms of the way in which they may undermine
democratic  institutions.  The  great  scholars  of corruption  ad-
dress its effects more broadly than this.  I had in mind two of my
own  countrymen, Judge John  Noonan7  who wrote  an extended
history of bribery,8  tracing it to periods, places, and institutions
that were not at all democratic, and Professor Robert Klitgaard,9
who has written  about the economic and developmental  effects
of corruption,"°  again  often in places  that are not democratic.
These  two  scholars  differ in  their approach  to  corruption.
Both recognize that it has a somewhat unusual double meaning.
The first definition  in  many dictionaries  is purely moral,  refer-
ring to any conduct or individual that is depraved, perverted,  or
debased  morally.  The  second  definition  is  often  more  closely
associated with  dishonesty or, even  more narrowly, with the  im-
proper use of a position  of trust for personal benefit.  Klitgaard
is most concerned with the practical consequences of betrayal  of
the  trust that has been placed  in an  individual in  giving him a
particular  position  in  business  or government.1"  Noonan  em-
7.  Reagan's Circuit Nominees  Confirmed in  1985, LEGAL  TIMES,  Jan.  6,  1986,  at  5.
Judge Noonan  sits on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Id.
8.  NOONAN,  supra note  2.
9.  ROBERT  KLITGAARD,  CONTROLLING  CORRUPTION  (1988)  [hereinafter  CONTROL,
LING CORRUPTION].  Robert Klitgaard is professor of economics at the University of Na-
tal,  South  Africa.  Robert Klitgaard,  What Can Be  Done? Fighting Corruption, UNESCO
COURIER, June 1996, at 34.
10.  CONTROLLING  CORRUPTION,  supra note  9.
11.  Id. at 11-12,  190.DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUTION
phasizes the far broader, moral meaning of being somehow de-
praved.12  Nevertheless,  both  focus on the  giving and receipt of
private benefits  in exchange  for favored treatment  by a govern-
ment official who is supposed to be deciding  the matter without
regard to his own private interests.
13
Corruption,  as secretly receiving  private benefits  to affect a
decision  that is  supposed to be  made  in  the interests  of others
and uninfluenced by private gain, is not solely a problem of gov-
ernments.  In  this sense,  a buying  agent for a corporation  may
also  be  corrupt  by  demanding  kickbacks  to  influence  his
purchasing  decisions.  Corruption  is  certainly  not  a  problem
solely  of democracies.  Some of the worst corruption  has taken
place  under  highly  undemocratic  governments  including  the
Communist governments  of the  Soviet Union and the People's
Republic  of China  and  the  authoritarian  governments  of re-
gimes such as those in Zaire and  Nigeria.
In terms of  Judge Noonan's interest in morality, all of these
settings share certain  morally relevant characteristics.  When an
individual who has been placed in a position of trust on the un-
derstanding that he will act on behalf of someone else's interest
and in  accordance  with  certain  understood  criteria instead  re-
ceives or demands personal benefits with the understanding that
these will influence his decision, there is a betrayal of trust, there
is deception and fraud, and there is a misuse of power.  The vic-
tim of the betrayal  of trust  is  whoever  gave  the  individual  the
right to act on  his behalf.  The  victims of the misuse  of power
include  those who  are  denied the  opportunity  to  deal  with an
organization  on honest  terms.  Both  groups  are  victims  of the
fraud.  These concepts are so basic that it is unsurprising  to find
that every nation forbids bribery as a core form of immorality. 4
From the perspective of Professor Robert Klitgaard, the pur-
poses  of an organization  that placed  trust in a dishonest agent
are defeated by that dishonesty.15  If it is a company trying to buy
the best material for its manufacturing  process, it is likely to get
something else.  If it is a government  trying to prevent environ-
mental  degradation,  it will  be  unable  to  accomplish  this.  Cor-
12.  NOONAN,  supra note 2, at 702.03.
13.  Id. at 685,  704-05;  CONTROLLING  CORRUPTION,  supra note 9,  at x-xi,  10-11,  46-
48.
14.  NOONAN,  supra note 2, at 702-03.
15.  CONTROLLING  CORRUPTION,  supra note 9, at 47.
1997]326  FORDHAM  INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL  [Vol. 20:323
ruption is not inconsistent with rapid growth as major nations in
Asia,  Latin  America,  and  Europe  have  demonstrated. 16  Busi-
nesses  can  come  to understand  a corrupt  regime.  But corrup-
tion is inconsistent with carrying out purposes of an administra-
tion that may be in conflict with the wishes of wealthy players in
the private sector.  In the long run, it is inconsistent with innova-
tion  by  businesses  spurred on  by  competition.  Illicit payments
become  a tempting substitute for lower  prices or product inno-
vation.
The short of the matter is  that even the most primitive and
simple of enterprises  cannot run without trust among its mem-
bers.  Cooperation requires trust, and truly efficient cooperation
requires a willingness to commit oneself to wholehearted pursuit
of the objectives of the enterprise.  That trust cannot survive the
payment  of private benefits  to a person who has agreed to  take
part in the cooperative  enterprise and has been given  the power
of others on the  understanding that those benefits will  be used
solely  for their  purposes  in  order  to induce  him  to  divert  the
powers granted to pursue the quite different objectives  of some-
one outside the enterprise.  Bribery of its members is, therefore,
a practice that every organization  forbids and states enforce this
prohibition when  dealing with  legitimate  enterprises where  co-
operation  is  to be encouraged.
A word  of caution is in order before  leaving this most gen-
eral  area of cooperation.  In real life,  it is  impossible  to wholly
separate private motivations from the use of authority entrusted
for specific, non-personal  purposes.  Not every  bit of loyalty to a
family member  or  a clan, not  every hope for a future  employ-
ment or a valued friendship,  may be forced out of the minds of
people entrusted with authority  for other specific purposes.  So
lines have  to be drawn, and different lines are drawn in different
societies.  To  recite  the  set  of conflict  of interest  rules  in  the
United States would take  a long time.  That the precise location
of the line, however, is a subject of dispute or even arbitrary does
not weaken  the  general  notion  that  we  must  forbid  payments
intended to breach the trust on which cooperative undertakings
depend.
16.  See id. at 30-36  (discussing corruption  as aid  to economic growth).DEMOCRACY AD CORRUPTION
II.  DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION
Latin Americans know better than most the use that leaders
of military  coups  have  made  of the  issue  of corruption.  It  is
probably the single charge most frequently set forth as ajustifica-
tion for a military take  over.  A century ago, Nietzsche  said that
corruption  is simply  the sign of the autumn  of a nation.
1 7
I  remember being in Guatemala  City early in  the adminis-
tration of President Vinicios  Cerezo,'8  at a time when he was al-
ready  being charged with  various  improprieties.19  Colonels on
several bases decided to launch a coup. 0  They were not stopped
by any significant number of people taking to the streets but by
the  Minister  of Defense,  whose  centrality  to  the  infant democ-
racy on that occasion made clear just how fragile the democracy
was.  A few days later, President Cerezo attempted to show popu-
lar support for democracy and his administration  by organizing
a public parade.  Few people appeared;  the procession consisted
almost entirely of school children brought in from the  country-
side.  Suspicions of corruption had weakened the public demand
for democracy to the point where it depended solely on the loy-
alty  and judgment  about  reactions  of foreign  governments  of
General Hector Gramajo, the Defense  Minister.  Similarly, many
believe  that  support  for democracy  in  Russia  is  today  danger-
ously  thin,  in large  part because  of popular resentment  of cor-
ruption in  President Yeltsin's  administration.
One  critical  relationship  between  corruption  and  democ-
racy  is  thus that corruption  can  deeply undermine  support for
democracy in any fragile democracy.  Corruption of an adminis-
tration in the United States is very likely to lead to the election of
the opposing party.  The U.S. democracy, however, is an old and
stable one where  the basic  institutions  are  not still  questioned.
Where  democracy  is  younger  and  more  fragile,  corruption
17.  FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE,  THE  GAY  SCIENCE,  § 23,  at 98  (Walter Kaufmann  trans.,
1974).
18.  Douglas Farah,  Guatemalan  President  Dashes Backers'  Hopes, WASH.  POST,  May  13,
1995,  at A21.  Vinicios  Cerezo  was President of Guatemala from 1986  until  1991.  Id.
19.  See,  id.  (describing  Guatemalan  discontent with  Cerezo);  Ken  Anderson  &
Jean-Marie Simon, Guatemala  Democracy is an Army  in Disguise, LA  TIMES,  May 29,  1988,
at 2  (criticizing army  dominance  of Guatemala  and  ineffectiveness  of Cerezo);  Wider
Army  Unease Behind Failed Coup, LATIN  Am.  WKL  REP.,  May  26,  1988,  at 3  (describing
May  11,  1988 coup attempt).
20.  Wider Army  Unease Behind Failed Coup, supra note 19,  at 3.
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seems  a  reason  to abandon  democracy  completely  in  favor  of
some form of other government that, it is hoped, will be free of
that vice.
In these contexts, where democracy is not firmly rooted, the
question  of corruption becomes  whom  does a  democratic  gov-
ernment  in  fact  serve?  President  Abraham  Lincoln  of  the
United  States  spoke  134  years  ago  in  the  Gettysburg  Address
about a government  "of the people,  by the  people, and for the
people" and asked whether it could long endure.21  We are ask-
ing whether any other kind of democratic  government  can en-
dure.  A corrupt, democratic  government is likely  to look like it
is for the wealthy and  the well-connected,  not a government by
and for  the  people.  If the  choice  to  much  of the  population
appears  to be one between  elected  figures  serving  the interests
of narrow  but wealthy  constituencies  or  authoritarian  govern-
ments  serving much broader  interests, democracy is  very much
at risk.
Democracy is also more vulnerable to charges of corruption
than other forms of government for two reasons.  First, the free-
dom  of speech,  press,  and  political  challenge  that  comes  with
democracy  allows  opponents  of  a  corrupt  administration  to
make much of its corruption.  A military government  or the gov-
ernment of a totalitarian communist regime simply does not tol-
erate  this.  Second,  democracies  have  the  special  problem  of
funding  expensive  political  activities.  If  they  are  not  to  be
funded from  tax revenues, they must be funded by private  indi-
viduals who will want something from the  candidates  they sup-
port.  Campaign  contributions  are  rarely disinterested.  Candi-
dates know from whom  they come and why, and candidates  re-
member  that they  will need  them again.  Their discharge  of a
trust afforded them  by all of the people  is inevitably affected by
their  personal  interest  in  raising  the  funds  necessary  to  be
elected.  This is a form of bribery,  however reluctant we may be
to use that term, and it undermines the support of elected gov-
ernments in a way that has no application to other governments.
Finally, there is the question of whether it is harder or easier
to attack corruption in a democracy.  I think it should be easier.
The people of every country hate corruption and feel cheated by
21.  Abraham  Lincoln,  Address  at  Gettysburg,  Pennsylvania  (Nov.  19,  1863),  in
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN,  SPEECHES AND  WRITINGS  1859-1865  536  (Library of America  1989).DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
it.  The more a government  is responsive  to its  citizens'  wishes,
the more likely the agents of government will feel a counterbal-
ance  to the temptations of corruption.  Moreover,  the existence
of a free press provides  an important mediator for public opin-
ion.  It can discover and document instances of corruption and
reveal  them  to sizable populations.  That  can be a powerful  de-
terrent.
In describing these relationships of corruption and democ-
racy, I have been too general in several ways.  Some final distinc-
tions may be useful.  Corruption may take place at a high level or
at low levels throughout a system.  It may be widespread and sys-
tematic at whatever  level  it  is  operating, or it may  be sporadic
and occasional.  Obviously the threat that corruption will  create
cynicism, suspicion, and eventually citizen distrust not only of an
administration but of the very manner by which administrations
are chosen, democratic  elections, depends upon which of these
areas of corruption is present.  High-level corruption is far more
dangerous  to democracy than  low-level corruption.  If the high-
est levels are honest, citizens are more likely to seek a change in
administration  to demand honesty at lower levels.  Systemic  cor-
ruption is far more dangerous to democracy than occasional and
sporadic corruption.  It may change the entire outlook of a pop-
ulation, leaving the trustworthy feeling as if they have been fool-
ish and encouraging children as well as adults to accept cheating
as  a way of life.
III.  WHAT CAN BE DONE IN A DEMOCRACY TO
END CORRUPTION?
I have spent weeks discussing problems of corruption in Ar-
gentina,  and  I  have  recently  returned  from  conversations  with
Italian  magistrates  addressing  corruption  in  Milan,  Naples,  Pa-
lermo, and Rome.  I have spent years dealing with corruption  in
the United States.  Every nation  is unique  in its particular forms
of corruption and in  the institutions and powers it has available
for dealing with them.  Every democratic nation is unique in the
support  that the fight against corruption  enjoys from high  gov-
emnment officials  and  from the  public at large.  Still,  there is a
logic to the problem of a democracy fighting corruption  that is
general wherever  the corruption  may be.  I  will  try  to  describe
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that logic, apologizing in  advance for the extent to which  I will
be emphasizing  the techniques used in  the United  States.
Choosing  the  United States  as an  example  is not simply  a
matter of convenience because  that is my country.  It is also use-
ful  because  the  United  States  has been  relatively  successful.  I
consider  the level  of corruption  in  the  United  States  low for a
country  so vast and diverse  and with  such  complicated  govern-
mental structures.  A good way of making this point is to say that
there  are  few  if any places  or types  of governmental  activities
where one  could safely  offer money to an executive,  legislative,
or judicial official  to influence his or her decision.  The United
States has brought about a high measure  of compliance  with  a
relatively  limited  commitment  of  law  enforcement  resources
(about two hundred years of FBI agent time each year and per-
haps about a hundred years of federal attorney time) and a pat-
tern of internal inspectors general in any state or federal depart-
ment affecting significant private  interests.
A.  Four Ways of Reducing Corruption
To understand  the  problem  a  democracy  faces  in  control-
ling corruption, it is a useful exercise to imagine trying to create
a setting for corruption  so perfect  that even a  decently  honest
person would be tempted severely.  Quite simply, we would want
a situation  with  a large  bribe,  unlikely  to  be  detected,  and an
atmosphere in which one was thought to be foolish, rather than
honorable, in  declining such  opportunities.
To get the large bribe, we need high stakes for private inter-
ests and realizing those stakes must turn on a governmental deci-
sion by a single individual.  If the decision is made by the concur-
rent decision of a number  of people,  the rewards  will  decrease
and the  risk will  grow.  For safety  from  detection,  the  decision
must either be so discretionary,  so lacking in standards, that the
purchased choice will  not look suspicious, or it must be hidden
in  the  obscurity  that  characterizes  some  of the  lowest  level  of
governmental  choices.
Even  with  these  conditions  met,  most  of us  would  feel  a
strong moral  compulsion not to take a bribe.  After all, as Judge
Noonan points out in his  book on bribes,  every nation has for-DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
bidden them22  and the prohibition is millennia old.23  To make
the perfect setting for a bribe, we  need a solvent of conscience.
That would  be an  atmosphere  in which  everyone  believed  that
loyalty was for fools, that everyone took what they could get, and
that one deserved ridicule more than praise for turning down an
opportunity  to enrich one's self in an  official capacity.  In addi-
tion, conscience  pangs may be reduced by a plausible argument
that the  particular  type  of payment  would not really  influence
one's  decision,  that the  decision  did not really  matter, or that
accepting  money on  this occasion  fell  into an  exception  to  the
rules about bribes.
Our task, in fighting corruption,  is  to eliminate as many of
these  conditions  as  possible.  Part  of the  difficulty  is  that they
reinforce  each  other.  It may not be possible to change the  mo-
res  of an  organization  or of the  government  without reducing
the opportunities for corrupt advantage.  But it is politically diffi-
cult to take the hard steps necessary to reduce the opportunities
for corruption  so long as cynicism  smothers social demands for
honesty.  The job of the corruption fighter is to deal with both of
these conditions simultaneously by making visible the corruption
that will outrage  the citizenry in a democracy and, with the sup-
port of that public reaction,  bringing  cases that show  that cor-
ruption is not safe.
Corruption,  thus,  can  and should  be  addressed simultane-
ously in four different areas.  The first two are major ways of at-
tempting to deal with corruption, but each of them requires sig-
nificant changes in what might otherwise be the preferred way of
conducting  the  business  of government.  First,  market  condi-
tions can be created to reduce the private stakes that turn on the
decision  of any  single  individual.  Second,  government  opera-
tions can be changed  to reduce the discretion  exercised  by offi-
cials.  The third approach  is to change public and organizational
attitudes  towards  self-dealing  when  using  government  authori-
ties.  I am going to focus, however, on a fourth set of alternatives,
the  development  of management  and  law  enforcement  strate-
gies with  the object of making corruption apparent  despite the
desire of the parties  to keep it secret.
22.  NOONAN,  supra note 2,  at 702-03.
23.  See id. at xx  (dividing history of bribery into epochs).
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B.  Strategies to Make Corruption Visible
The central concept behind both management and law en-
forcement  strategies  is coming to understand  the  difficulties  of
engaging in corruption  secretly in different settings.  To engage
in  corruption,  a  government  official  and  a  private  party must
identify  each  other as  potential corrupt partners, find  a way  of
reaching an  agreement, and then  deliver what each  has prom-
ised  without  being  detected.  Each  of these  steps  can  be  ex-
tremely difficult,  for in  each  there  are vulnerabilities  to  detec-
tion.
Let  me  give  you  an  example.  How  could  a judge  who
wanted  to  be  corrupt  in  adjudicating  a  civil  case  let  a  litigant
know that he  is willing to take a bribe without exposing himself
to investigation  and prosecution?  If a judicial rule generally for-
bids meeting with a single party in the absence  of the other, any
private meeting will raise suspicions and is likely to be detected.
Putting that impediment in the way  of a secret  transaction is an
important  management  tactic  as  part  of an  overall  strategy  of
making the secrecy  necessary for corruption difficult and uncer-
tain.  Moreover,  the  litigants  before  the judge  are  likely  to
change  regularly so there are too many for the judge to contact
safely  with  a  corrupt  offer.  It  would  be  much  safer  to  deal
through  particular  lawyers,  but  they  will  have  to  let  litigants
know  of their  contacts  with  the judge  and  that,  too,  imposes
risks.  It may also  be  difficult  for the judge  to  deliver.  If he  is
regularly reversed by higher courts in cases involving a particular
attorney who always seems to win, that may be noticed by oppos-
ing attorneys and lead to rumors that then come to the attention
of law enforcement authorities.
In short, the processes  that are  necessary to market corrup-
tion have vulnerabilities attached  to them.  Exploiting those vul-
nerabilities, once identified, is the central concept of any law en-
forcement or management strategy to control corruption.  Iden-
tifying  these  vulnerabilities  to  detection  requires  coming  to
understand, for different settings, what tradition or practicality  is
likely to dictate  the mechanics  of three things:  finding corrupt
partners, making payments, and delivering what is purchased-
each  in  an  inconspicuous  way.  Corruption  is  likely  to  work  in
ways dictated by an  organization's routines and local social con-
ditions.DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
The corrupt deal also  depends upon the particular area of
governmental  activity.  Beyond  mere theft of government prop-
erty, the methods of carrying out corruption and, thus, the vul-
nerability to detection is  likely to differ in the cases of different
forms  of police corruption, sale  of exemptions  from regulation
or tax collection,  grease  payments to speed a slow process,  cor-
rupt procurement,  sale of access  to inside  information,  legisla-
tion, and judicial decisions.  Different strategies are necessary de-
pending upon the different situations and ways in which corrup-
tion takes place because  the strategies should depend upon how
vulnerable  to  detection  each  type of corrupt business  is  in  the
tasks of finding corrupt partners, making payments, and deliver-
ing what is purchased.
C.  The Importance of the Tools of Management
I  have spoken  of law enforcement  and management strate-
gies because we have learned that preventive management strate-
gies are, in some settings,  as important as law enforcement strat-
egies.  To  deal  with widespread  or simply low level corruption,
prosecution  is  likely to  be  too  costly,  clumsy,  and  sporadic  an
answer.  Management  controls are essential.  Management  strat-
egies  also  have  the advantage  of allowing the  chief to  put into
place  systems  that will  make  more visible  unusual decisions,  or
unusual  benefits, or the  agreements that  link them.  I have  al-
ready  mentioned  computer  systems  and  requirements  of  ap-
proval by several officials.  Periodic review of decisions, reporting
requirements  in  terms of an  employee's  changing  financial  as-
sets, and conflict of interest rules are all familiar examples.  Man-
agement systems can also allow remedial  action to be taken  ear-
lier and on a less certain basis  than  criminal  prosecution.
There  is a paradox about the notion  of fighting corruption
by management change in internal operating systems.  A dishon-
est employee  who  is prepared  to  take  a bribe  in  exchange  for
forgoing the  obligations  he has assumed  will  also be  willing  to
ignore or circumvent record  keeping, review, or other manage-
ment requirements  designed  to make  any corrupt action  more
visible.  So the crucial characteristics of any management  device
designed to prevent corruption are that efforts to circumvent the
device  are  more  likely  to  be  detected  than  would  corruption
without  it and that compliance  makes  corruption  either more
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visible or, like the  U.S. prohibition  of judges meeting  with one
party alone,  more difficult  to carry out.
D.  The Needed Political  and Institutional  Structures
Finally, we have learned that a set of institutional and polit-
ical structures  of support are  necessary  to carry out either a law
enforcement  or  a  management  strategy  against  corruption.
Making  use  of  law  enforcement  and  management  strategies
based on analysis of the vulnerability  to detection  of corruption
in different settings depends  on four conditions being satisfied:
1.  The  necessary  substantive  laws  defining  illegal  conduct
and the  necessary laws creating preventive  measures, such  as
a rule  requiring sealed  bids or forbidding  ex parte meetings
with judges;
2.  The  needed  management,  auditing,  and  investigative
powers to find out if the substantive laws are being complied
with;
3.  The  necessary  organizational  structures  to carry  out  the
enforcement of the  laws;  and
4.  Sufficient popular political support for attacking  corrup-
tion to induce elected leaders at a high enough level to tackle
it  i.e.,  to carry out the previous  steps:
a.  General public  outrage over  corruption;  and
b.  Threat of media or legislative  disclosure of whatever
corruption  is ignored  or covered up.
These deserve  special attention in any discussion of the relation-
ship of corruption to democracy.
IV.  CREATING THE NEEDED STRUCTURES FOR
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL  SUPPORT IN
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
A.  Clarifying the Legal and Organizational  Obligations to Avoid
Self-Dealing
The first step of carrying out a strategy for dealing with cor-
ruption in a particular area or in all areas is to define with some
precision what is  forbidden.  As Judge Noonan  notes,  through-
out history this has proved far more difficult than we sometimesDEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
recognize.24  The questions of definitions for criminal purposes
that we  have found most difficult in the United  States are:
" In what  situations  should  we  prohibit  or  limit campaign
contributions intended to win the favor of a particular offi-
cial or, at least, gain preferred  access to him or her?
" How do we deal with reciprocity  where  there  is  no articu-
lated understanding or quid pro quo, particularly when there
is  a chain  of reciprocity  that involves  more  than  two  peo-
ple?
* Is  receiving  some  benefits in  exchange  for exercising  dis-
cretion  in  a particular  way  permissible  if the  government
loses  nothing;  for example,  where  it is  buying  a uniform
good or service that sells for an established price from one
seller rather than another?
" When  is  it  all  right  to furnish  advanced  information  and
when  is  it wrong?
" Is it a conflict  of interest for  a government  official  to con-
tinue to decide matters of importance  to company X when
he  or she  anticipates  seeking  employment  from  the com-
pany but no negotiations  have  taken place?
All of these are very difficult questions.
In other countries, another problem  of definition  is funda-
mental, the line between  a gift and a bribe.  In some  countries,
for example Germany, it is improper to start an investigation un-
less investigators know what the official  did in  exchange for the
money.  In the United States, it is sufficient that an official knew
that something was given in appreciation  for an official act.  Be-
yond that, the United States has specific ethical prohibitions  for
receiving  gifts.25  I attended  a conference  on corruption in Ber-
lin during February of 1995.26  A number of the German  speak-
ers addressed the  corrupting effect  of gifts given  for five  or six
years  before a favor is  even  asked.  They spoke of prices being
thirty percent higher in  public construction  in Frankfurt  and it
being almost  impossible  for  an  honest competitor  to  compete
when large presents are accepted without thought and reciproc-
ity is considered  absolutely natural.
The managerial rules must also be made explicit.  How fully
24.  See NOONAN,  supra note 2, at 687-90, 695-99  (distinguishing types of reciprocal
exchanges).
25.  18  U.S.C.  § 201.
26.  Korruption  in Deutschland:  Ursachen,  Erscheinungsformen,  Bek5.mpfungsst-
rategien  (Berlin, Feb.  16-17,  1995).
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are  decisions  to be  documented?  How much of a record  must
be kept?  What forms of review will there be?  What are the inter-
nal rules for disqualification?
The point is simply that we all have  a general  idea of what
conduct is so self-serving that it should be forbidden by criminal
law or management provisions.  But the extent of vagueness and
disagreement within that general category itself poses a substan-
tial  impediment to fighting corruption.  Clarifying the rules is a
necessary first step.
B.  The Need for Investigative and Managerial  Powers to Determine if
the Rules are Being Followed
It is  well to begin  with  a reminder of a half dozen  serious
difficulties facing those fighting corruption whether  by manage-
rial or criminal  processes.  First, those who know about the cor-
ruption  are  likely  to  be participants  or close  friends  of partici-
pants  and  unwilling  to  furnish  information.  Second,  partici-
pants will not willingly create records that disclose the existence
of corruption.  Third, efforts to discover corrupt officials by hav-
ing investigators pretend to be private parties willing to pay for a
governmental  decision  are  often  regarded  as  politically  moti-
vated or immoral  unless  there  is  first significant  evidence  that
corruption is ongoing in a particular area.  Fourth, investigators
often fear economic or other reprisals by the subjects of an inves-
tigation.  Fifth, the complexity of the business and government
setting in which corruption may take place is likely to pose grave
difficulties for investigators who are unfamiliar with the activities
they  are  reviewing.  Finally,  fighting  corruption  is  made  more
difficult  by  the fact  that often  the  merits  of a  decision  are  un-
clear  so  that  it is  almost  impossible  to  identify  highly  unusual
governmental  actions.  We  should  think  about the  needed  law
enforcement and  managerial powers  against this background.
Even this imposing list of difficulties  may hide a deep-seated
problem in investigating  corruption.  I know it is deeply trouble-
some in  each  of our countries.  Broad  public  cynicism  will un-
dermine  a healthy  democracy.  Thus,  members  of Congress  in
the United  States complain  bitterly about the  attitude  many in
our  public  have  towards  them.  I  am  sure  it is  much  worse  in
some other countries.  Preventing corruption, the only real cure
for  cynicism,  requires,  however,  that  police,  prosecutors,  andDEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
management  be  vigilant and indeed  suspicious in watching  for
corruption.  Because  the  temptation  is  always  present,  corrup-
tion will reappear  if we  do not watch for it.
Watching  requires  investigating  by internal units  or by po-
lice and prosecutors, and there is nothing that elected or career
officials  like less than public investigations of their activities.  In-
vestigations invade their privacy, damage their reputations, make
it more difficult for them to continue in office, and damage pub-
lic respect for their institutions.  Thus, corruption investigations
are  the least popular form of law  enforcement among  officials,
although  often  the most popular with the public at large.
I was confronted with this dilemma sharply in the ABSCAM
investigations  in  the  United  States.  There  were  rumors  that
members  of Congress  were  willing to  take  money in exchange
for legislative action.  Such rumors  themselves,  especially  if not
responded  to, breed  public  cynicism.  In response,  the  FBI  of-
fered money to whomever was  rumored  to be willing to  take it.
A number of members  of Congress took the FBI  bribes. 27  The
resulting scandal was immensely resented by perfectly honorable
members of our Congress, some of whom had been investigated
and many  of whom  had  not.2 8  Failing  to follow-up  on the  ru-
mors, however, would have bred distrust.  The situation is typical
of that  confronting  law  enforcement  officials  after  they  have
learned  of suspicions or rumors  of corruption  and  before they
are quite sure of who is involved and who is not.  In that interme-
diate stage,  every effort to detect wrong-doing  is likely to be in-
terpreted  as  an  unfair  invasion  of privacy,  causing  improper
damage to an individual's and an institution's reputation.  In the
long run, however,  the  price  of public  trust  in  its  elected  and
other officials  is that law enforcement  officials follow-up on ru-
mors and investigate.
1. The Needed Law Enforcement  Powers
The  powers  of law enforcement  officers  must be  adequate
to become aware  of likely corruption, to turn suspicion into evi-
dence, and to rebut the passionate denials of one of two parties
to a corrupt exchange.
How do investigators become aware of a problem of corrup-
27.  NOONAN,  supra note 2, at 607-10;  Myers, 635 F.2d at 947-48.
28.  NOONAN,  supra note 2, at 616-19.
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tion in  a particular  area?  In the  United States,  they will  follow
media  reports and pursue  rumors and suspicions  of those who
work in an area that, because of tradition  or vulnerability to cor-
ruption,  is likely  to be  corrupt, and they will  invite  complaints,
anonymous  or  otherwise,  by  competitors,  clients,  or fellow  em-
ployees.  Investigators  will  also  establish  formal  auditing proce-
dures to review records that are required to be kept by particular
government officials or by private individuals who may be paying
a  bribe.  Beyond  this,  by  making  known  the  seriousness  with
which the United States  takes corruption, the U.S. Government
lets  criminals  of  all  sorts  know  that  their  cooperation  in  up-
rooting corruption  is likely  to reduce  their sentences.
To  transform  a reasonable  suspicion  that  there  is  corrup-
tion  in a  particular area  into  a criminal  prosecution,  investiga-
tors need  the power  to review  official records  of the actions  of
suspected officials to detect patterns of favoritism.  They need to
be  able  to  subpoena  private  financial  records  in  the  hope  of
finding  evidence  of  improper  payments  or  receipts.  It  helps
greatly if investigators  may  trade  a reduced sentence  or immu-
nity from prosecution for testimony from someone who works in
the area of suspected corruption but who has been caught giving
a bribe  or in another  crime  and  is anxious  to make  a deal.  In
Italy,  as  in  the  United  States,  some  investigators  have  learned
that allowing  bribers to declare  themselves  the victims of extor-
tion will  generate  a great deal of evidence  of bribe-taking. 9  Fi-
nally, investigators  may disguise  themselves  as corrupt individu-
als and offer  to engage in  corrupt transactions.
To deal with the problem  of the lack of credibility as a wit-
ness of someone who has engaged in  corrupt transactions  him-
self and  now stands to benefit  by  a reduced sentence,  the  U.S.
Government relies extensively on the use of recording devices or
microphones.  Then the informant or undercover agent can be
asked to discuss past, ongoing, or future corrupt activities with a
suspect.  The  tape  of the resulting  conversation  will more  than
offset the  difference  in  credibility between  a high level govern-
29.  See,  e.g.,  Selwyn  Raab,  New  York  Officials of Plumbing Union Charged in Bribery,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,  1993, at  I (stating that New York District Attorney's office does not
indict bribers  who are victims of extorsion);  Brunella  Giovara & Nino  Pietropinto,  To-
rino, interrogato Romiti; All'uscita dalla procura: 6 andato tutto bene.  I  legali: ha fornito le
spiegazioni richieste, LA  STAMPA, June  16,  1995 (reporting that Fiat employees accused of
bribery  were later treated as victims  of extortion).DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
ment official  and  someone who  has admitted  to  being a bribe
giver.
2.  The Needed  Management and Auditing Powers
Managers need the power to do whatever  is necessary to as-
sess  honesty in  hiring.  A lack  of background  checks  has been
blamed for the extent of police corruption in some of our cities
such  as Washington,  D.C."0  Managers  need  the  power  to  test
employees by providing false  opportunities for corruption or by
establishing systems  to monitor what people with financial inter-
ests regularly  select  which  officials  to  deal  with.  Unions  often
object to such tests, but these tests are essential.  Managers who
strongly suspect that corrupt activities  are taking place need the
power  to transfer  or reassign  individuals  without proof of their
involvement  in corruption.  Much corruption  may be prevented
by  regularly  rotating individuals,  thereby disrupting established
relations with those paying  graft.
In addition, managers need the power to transfer and reas-
sign  subordinates  who  are making no  effort to  deal  with likely
corruption  in areas under their responsibility.  In New Orleans,
for  example,  where  a number  of officers  were  found to  be  en-
gaged  in  drug  dealing3'  and  recently  one  convicted  of  con-
tracting for  murder,2  the  chief of police  needed  the power  to
impose some form of sanction on supervisors who did nothing to
prevent this conduct.  They also needed more punitive sanctions
to fire or suspend officers.  Non-vested pension rights can help a
great deal.
Besides these powers over the individual  employee, manag-
ers fighting  corruption need  the powers  to  shape  an  organiza-
tion's processes  so  as  to  make  an  individual  exercise  of discre-
tion less frequent and more transparent in cases where the deci-
sion  is of substantial  financial importance  to private  individuals
or organizations.  The manager can involve more  than one per-
son in making the decision and require review of the decision at
higher levels.  He or she may require bidding procedures.  He or
she  may impose record-keeping  requirements  that may help by
30.  Philip P. Pan, D.C., P.G. To Recruit 400 Officers; Hirings are Largest Since  '89-'90
Expansion, WASH.  PosT, May  19,  1996, at B1.
31.  Adam Nossiter, Police in New Orleans: Film Noir in Real Life, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  19,
1994, at A14.
32.  Former Police Officer Sentenced To Death, TIMES-PICAYUNE,  Nov. 7,  1996,  at B3.
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identifying the irregular government decision or forcing the cor-
rupt  employee  to  an  uncomfortable  choice  between  revealing
the irregular  transaction or falsely accounting for it and risking
discovery or failing to  account altogether for it and  risking dis-
covery.
Often it is easier to identify a missing or false record than to
find the underlying offense.  Finally, the manager may need the
authority to destroy trust in the market for corruption  by having
honest officials pose as corrupt and then report any overtures.
Armed with these powers, law enforcement and government
managers largely can deter corruption if they have the advantage
of the organizational  structures necessary  to use these powers to
enforce  the rules.  So, let us turn to that.
C.  The Necessary Organizational  Structures to Enforce the Rules
The final capacity that both managers and law enforcement
officers  need  is  the power  to  create  offices  that are  motivated,
skilled,  and  independent  to  enforce  the  rules  I  have just de-
scribed.  Such  structures  are  needed  in  at  least  four  places.
There  must  be  effective  inspection  and  auditing  units  within
every organization.  Some police investigative units must be spe-
cialized in public corruption.  Prosecutors have to have sufficient
credibility  as well  as  skills  in  these  cases.  Additionally,  courts
must be  available to try cases  of corruption within a reasonable
period of time and with adequate  accuracy.
1.  Internal Inspection  Units
As a start, only such units may become highly specialized in
the work and, thus, in the possibilities and vulnerabilities of cor-
ruption in the highly specific setting of a particular governmen-
tal function or location.  Part of the problem  is skills.  Police are
not normally trained  in the accounting and auditing  skills that
are necessary  for detecting corruption  in complicated  financial
or business  transactions.  Part of the problem is experience.  In-
ternal  investigators  can  and will  become  expert enough  in the
business of the agency to  detect unusual  patterns in  records  or
visible behavior.  A final part is concentration of effort.  An inter-
nal agency may best put together a portfolio of preventive detec-
tion and remedial  measures for a manager anxious to fight cor-
ruption.DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
In addition, an internal inspection agency may be given  the
power  to  put in  place  or to  recommend  that  there  be  put in
place internal processes  to create the information sources which
are  likely  to  reveal  otherwise  hidden  corruption.  These  will
often  be management information  or other record-keeping  sys-
tems.  Sometimes,  there will be simply a network of human con-
tacts.  The latter is  particularly important in police  work.
What are the crucial conditions necessary  for such agencies
to play their role?  Investigators  need vigorous  support for their
mission at the highest level of the agency.  The agency head may
demonstrate that support by the vigor with which he or she pur-
sues any signs of corruption.  The agency head may be brought
to want  to demonstrate  such support by being held responsible
for corruption  in  the agency whether or not he was aware  of it
and  by  making  sure  that  information  about  corruption  in  the
agency is likely  to be brought out by the press, independent au-
ditors,  or  investigative  committees.  Such  internal  investigative
units also  need independence  from the threat  of later reprisals
by  those  within or  outside  of the  agencies  whose  activities  are
being systematically  reviewed.
With all of these powers and support, the  success  of an in-
ternal anti-corruption  agency depends importantly upon the in-
ternal  culture of the parent  organization.  Where  corruption  is
thought of as normal,  employees feel they have nothing to lose
by  way  of reputation  or  adequate  pay,  and  everyone  believes
someone else will be corrupt if not they.  It may take mammoth
steps,  far  beyond  the  powers  of  an  internal  anti-corruption
agency, to change  that culture.  The  problems are doubly  com-
plicated when the parent organization is thought to be incompe-
tent in many ways, for incompetence results in decisions that are
often indistinguishable  from one of the telltale  signs of corrupt
decisions, inexplicability.
2.  Specialized  Police  Units
Specialized police units must supplement internal investiga-
tive units as one of the important checks  on their vigor and  in-
tegrity.  Moreover, only a police  unit may carry an investigation
outside  of an  organization,  examining  the  activities  of the pri-
vate parties  involved in corruption.  Furthermore,  in the United
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States, often police are much better trained to turn information
about corruption into a form  that is usable  in criminal  trials.
Why do we  need these specialized units?  As we  have seen,
anti-corruption  laws  are  difficult  to  interpret.  Anti-corruption
investigations  are  necessarily  more  intrusive  and,  therefore,
more difficult and sensitive than investigations in which there is
a victim  to  complain.  A  specialized  police  corruption  unit  is
likely to  develop  an  esprit de corps that will  generate  the  energy
necessary  to  sustain  interest  over  time.  Furthermore,  because
corruption investigations  are  likely  to be long, officers  who  are
not specialized and who are dealing with other matters will find
the  urgency of violent crime  displacing the long-term  demands
of fighting corruption.
The  members  of these  units  particularly  need  protection
against  the retaliation  of powerful  political  figures.  They need
specialized training.  They should learn to work closely with pro-
fessionals trained in the law, who can guide them through inves-
tigative steps without threatening democratic institutions by mis-
take.
3.  The  Role  of the Prosecutor
The role of the prosecutor is a crucial role, for it is the pros-
ecutor  who  can  most  vigorously  assert  one  of the  central  de-
mands of the  rule  of law,  that  the powerful,  including  elected
leaders, are subject to the law and cannot legally or safely  serve
their  private  interests.  Making  this  point  effectively  with  the
public  is  at the heart of the task of dealing with  corruption.
The most serious problem  in every country is  that prosecu-
tors are  suspected  of being  heavily involved  with  the  potential
targets of their investigations.  They are, therefore, suspected  of
either favoring friends among the powerful or unfairly targeting
opponents  of the powerful.  Moreover,  to the extent the  prose-
cutor  succeeds  in  embodying  public  demands  to  pursue  and
punish the corrupt,  the prosecutor  becomes a prominent polit-
ical figure, adding to the suspicions of his motivations.  We have
seen  examples of this in the United States,33  Italy,3 4 Spain," 3  Ar-
33.  Neil A.  Lewis,  Special Prosecutors'  Inquiries Have Led to Doubts About  Their Useful-
ness, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  1, 1996,  §1,  at 38.
34.  Charles Trueheart, Ciao Time for Italy's Harassed  Graft-Buster,  WAsH.  Posr,  Nov.
26, 1996 at A10.  Antonio di Pietro became the most prominent magistrate investigatingDEMOCRACY AD  CORRUPTION
gentina, 6  and Colombia.37
The major problem  is, thus, to insure in a way that is credi-
ble  to  the  public  that  a  prosecutor  is  willing  to  bring  cases
against the powerful and to resist pressure to bring unwarranted
cases against the opponents of the powerful.  This assurance may
not be achieved by a public pressure so intense that the prosecu-
tor will  be responding or catering to it and not to the merits of
the  case.
For  these  reasons,  there  are  a  variety  of  devices  in  the
United States for providing "outside" prosecutors in some cases
of political  corruption.  Federal  prosecutors attached to  the na-
tional Government handle most cases of state and local corrup-
tion.  In addition, an independent counsel, appointed by judges,
handles federal  cases  involving  the highest level  officials  in  the
Federal Government.  Even such special prosecutors require reli-
able investigators, but we have found that the Federal Bureau  of
Investigation  can handle  that responsibility with  independence
and skill.
There  are, of course, problems with special  counsel.  They
are likely to be less familiar with the operations of a government.
They may have a strong desire to establish their own reputations
at the expense of political figures.  They may be reluctant to dis-
miss  technical  or  ambiguous conduct  that is  generally  ignored
and should not really be treated as criminal.  They do guarantee,
however,  credibility in  this politically  sensitive area.
4.  Adequate  Court Systems
Finally, criminal prosecutions are essential to guarantee the
integrity  of a system, particularly  with  regard to  high-level  offi-
cials, and they depend upon court systems that are adequate and
sufficiently  independent to try  major figures.  I  have worked  in
developing  countries where neither capacity nor independence
could be assumed.  The result is that any such trial would some-
the "clean hands" scandal, which revealed widespread corruption  in Italian  politics and
business.  Id.  Di Pietro  himself has been  charged with  corruption  several  times.  Id.
35.  Unpopular  Parties,  ECONOMIST,  Dec.  14,  1996, at 513.
36.  Sebastian  Rotella,  Argentine President Lashes Out At  Corruption Charges; Latin
America: Menem Calls Rivals "Irresponsible." They Have Linked Administration to Drugs, Mur-
der and Mafia, LA  TIMES,  Oct. 17,  1996, at All.
37.  Sam Dillon,  Colombia's Chief  Is Charged But a Tangled Inquiry Looms,  N.Y. TIMES,
Feb.  16,  1996, at A2.
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how get delayed and obstructed along the way and would be un-
likely  to  lead  to  a  guilty verdict  even  when  it  was  clearly  war-
ranted  by  the  evidence.  Charges  against  the  wealthy  and  the
powerful are always difficult to handle efficiently, promptly, and
at reasonable cost.  They must be pursued, however, or the anti-
corruption  system  will  lack  credibility.  If  the  promotion  of
judges  in  a career  system  or future  political  appointment in  a
system that selects its judges in that way obviously depends upon
the  favor of those  who are being tried, the results will  also  lack
credibility.
All this  is  true of more  than  courts.  Each  of the  agencies
that  I  have  described  must  somehow  be  given  a  substantial
amount of independence  from the highest political  leadership.
So  must the  committees  of the  legislature  that  can  investigate
corruption.  There are a variety of devices for this even within an
administration.  Under  President Jimmy  Carter, Attorney  Gen-
eral Griffin  Bell published  rules stating that my decisions as the
Chief Prosecutor would not be overruled  by my superiors except
in  public  and  with  an  explanation  of reasons. 3 8  A legislature
may  create  similar  protections  for  prosecutors  through  provi-
sions  like  our  independent  counsel  laws.  Most  important,  of
course,  is  tradition.  High political  officials  may make  it public
and obvious that they will respect a tradition of independence  of
law enforcement officers, particularly  in cases alleging crimes by
high officials.  This in turn, however, often depends upon popu-
lar demands.
D.  Popular  Demands  for Political  Leaders to Take the Steps Described
Above to End Corruption
The simple fact of the matter is that high level officials have
little  incentive  to  take  the  issue  of corruption  seriously,  aside
from  public  demands  enforced  through  election  machinery.
This is obviously true if officials are themselves vulnerable  to ex-
posure  for improper actions.  I helped  set up the Independent
Prosecutor's  Office  that  investigated  President  Richard  Nixon
for Watergate. 9  The President did not willingly take the step of
38.  See  DANIEL J. MEADOR,  THE PRESIDENT,  THE  ATTORNEY  GENERAL,  AND  THE  DE.
PARTMENT  OF JUSTICE  58-60  (1980)  (discussing  procedures  in  the  Attorney General's
office).
39.  Babcock,  supra note  1, at A9.DEMOCRACY AND  CORRUPTION
appointing  a special  prosecutor,  Archibald  Cox.'  He did  not
willingly  take  action  against  his  own  chief  aides,  John  Eh-
rlichman,4'  Bob  Haldeman,"  Charles  Colson,4"  and  John
Dean."  He did not willingly  turn over tapes that would expose
his own wrong-doing.45  He did not willingly appoint a new spe-
cial  prosecutor  after firing  Archibald  Cox.'  He  took  each  of
these steps because  the immense  power of the public demands
that he take them and for no other reason.
Even  when  elected  officials are  less directly involved,  how-
ever, they are unlikely to find advantage in pursuing corruption
in  their  own  houses.  Elected  officials  have other more  impor-
tant issues  to worry about.  They  know that something  close to
corruption often funds their campaigns  and their parties.  Expo-
sure  of self-dealing within  their governments  creates  more  bad
publicity than good.  Moreover,  those revealed to be involved in
corruption are likely to point their fingers at others.  Finally, the
targets  of corruption  investigations  are  likely  to  be  friends  or
supporters of high political leaders.
Despite all this, there is a great interest throughout the law
enforcement  community in  the  United  States  in  bringing cor-
ruption cases, and there is no  likelihood of a high political fig-
ure preventing these institutions from carrying out their respon-
sibilities.  What makes the response to corruption vigorous in the
United  States  is  the  political  potency of the issue  and, particu-
larly, of accusations  of "cover-up."  It is the reciprocal support of
formal and informal systems, of government and press, of inves-
tigation  and  scandal.  This  has  been true  in  the  case of Water-
gate,47 Iran-Contra,4 8 Whitewater,49 and every other major public
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investigation.
For many countries, the problem  is to create or release pub-
lic anger  at corruption  and  at the failure  to  deal  with it.  The
public  can become passive if it believes that corruption is inher-
ent in the very nature of government, that the state goes its own
way  and is  not responsive  to public  demands,  that everyone  in
private or public life is out for themselves anyway, and that cover-
up is the normal practice  of governments.  These turn out to be
self-fulfilling  beliefs  because  they  kill  the  political  demand  for
honesty by  making it seem  naive, undermining public  spirited-
ness  and  hope.  Yet,  without  a  powerful,  public  demand  for
strong  action  against  corruption,  political  leaders  will  not act
against  it, and  a failure  to act reinforces  public  skepticism.  So
the  cycle goes on and on.
A  government  that  wants  to  dispel  these  self-fulfilling
doubts  and  encourage  the  public  demands  that are  the  final
guarantee of significant action against corruption must take dra-
matic  actions that establish  hope.  Internal  reforms and reorga-
nizations are unlikely to have  this effect.  The public is too likely
to believe that they are just for show.  What is often necessary is
to bring charges against  the highest  level  officials who are  cor-
rupt and  to  dramatically  withdraw  political  control  of how  the
charges  are  then  handled,  leaving  that  to  judicial  and
prosecutorial  professionals.
There  is,  at least potentially, a great public interest in  cor-
ruption  and  cover-up.  This  is  manifest  all  over  Europe,  the
United  States, and Japan with  considerable  regularity.  It is also
true of Latin America.  That interest may be swamped by intense
concerns  about  a war  or  depression,  but it is  likely to  be  very
prominent at most times.  Only a widespread and profound cyni-
cism  can  eliminate  that interest.  It is  the  core responsibility  of
political  leaders  to  prevent  that cynicism,  that distancing  from
the state and from any sense of public responsibility, from occur-
ring.  That is  the final  requirement for fighting corruption.
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